On 5 October 2026, the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (the “President of UOKiK”, “UOKiK”) brought charges against four Google group companies for allegedly abusing a dominant position in negotiations with Polish press publishers. The proceedings concern remuneration for the use of press publications in Google Search, Google News and Google Discover. According to UOKiK, when proposing remuneration rates to publishers, Google failed to provide the information required by law to enable them to assess those rates. Google faces a fine of up to 10% of its turnover.

To our knowledge, this is the first antitrust case in Poland in which charges have been brought in relation to press publishers’ related right. The proceedings are at an early stage, so we suggest treating this as a development to monitor.

Background: press publishers’ related right

The amendment to the Copyright and Related Rights Act, which entered into force on 20 September 2024, implemented Directive 2019/790 (the “DSM Directive”). It granted press publishers a related right in respect of press publications used online (Articles 99⁷–99¹⁷ of the Copyright and Related Rights Act of 4 February 1994, hereinafter the “Copyright Act”). In practice, this means that an online platform may use extracts from articles in return for remuneration agreed in advance with the publisher.

The key elements of this mechanism are:

• Disclosure obligation – publishers are entitled to obtain up-to-date information from the service provider and access its documentation to the extent necessary to determine the amount of remuneration (Article 99¹¹ of the Copyright Act).
• Dispute resolution procedure – negotiations, followed by mediation before the President of the Office of Electronic Communications (the “President of UKE”) and, if no agreement is reached, a decision by the President of UKE determining the remuneration, which may be challenged before a court.
• Authors’ share – authors are entitled to 50% of the revenue received by the publisher on this basis (Article 99⁹ of the Copyright Act).

As UOKiK emphasises, these provisions also serve a purpose beyond economics: remuneration is intended to support an independent and pluralistic press, which loses traffic and revenue when users limit themselves to extracts displayed in search results or AI-generated summaries.

The substance of the allegations

UOKiK alleges that Google’s negotiations with publishers were not genuine, as publishers lacked the information needed to assess its offers. According to UOKiK’s press release, Google failed, among other things, to:

• explain how it uses press publications;
• disclose the revenue it generates from that use;
• identify the parameters used to calculate the proposed rates; or
• provide documents enabling publishers to verify the assumptions underlying those calculations.

In UOKiK’s view, this creates an information asymmetry: publishers cannot assess the commercial merits of an offer or submit their own counter-offer supported by data. Publishers also depend on Google as a means of reaching readers and lack comparable bargaining power. The dominant platform can therefore impose rates and terms, preventing the statutory mechanism from operating as intended.

“Big Tech companies cannot place themselves above the law. The provisions clearly specify what information Google should provide to publishers to ensure that they are fairly remunerated for the content it uses. The absence of this information meant that negotiations became a sham, aimed at enabling the dominant market player to impose its terms.” – Tomasz Chróstny, President of UOKiK.

The charges concern four companies, and the liability of each will be examined during the proceedings:

An important qualification: the President of UOKiK is not a party to the dispute and does not assess whether the proposed rates are appropriate. The amount of remuneration may be determined by the President of UKE. Two sets of proceedings to determine the remuneration payable by Google under the Copyright Act are already pending before the President of UKE, following applications by the Association of Journalists and Publishers REPROPOL and the Digital Publishers Employers’ Association. These are not antitrust proceedings: according to UKE, they are the first administrative proceedings in Poland concerning the determination of remuneration for press publishers. The deadline in the proceedings initiated on REPROPOL’s application has been extended to 26 December 2026, and UKE has indicated that an expert is highly likely to be appointed in that case. The proceedings before UKE and UOKiK are independent of one another, although UKE may draw on materials collected by UOKiK.

Google denies the allegations, stating that it applies a uniform payment model across Europe and has entered into licence agreements with more than 20 Polish publishers, including the Polish Press Agency (PAP), covering over 70 Polish news websites and more than 5,500 across Europe. UOKiK points out, however, that most publishers still have no agreement in place, and that the mere conclusion of an agreement does not rule out certain terms having been imposed on them.

Legal characterisation and potential sanctions

The conduct described falls within the prohibition on abuse of a dominant position under Article 9(1) of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act of 16 February 2007 (the “Competition Act”). Given its EEA dimension and potential effect on trade between Member States, Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) is also likely to apply; both provisions may be applied in parallel.

The allegation concerns exploitative rather than exclusionary conduct: UOKiK does not allege that Google is eliminating competitors, but that it is exploiting its advantage over its trading partners – the publishers. The most closely corresponding statutory forms of abuse are:

• imposing unfair purchase conditions (Article 9(2)(1) of the Competition Act; Article 102(a) TFEU – “unfair trading conditions”);
• imposing onerous contractual terms that confer unjustified benefits on the dominant undertaking (Article 9(2)(6) of the Competition Act).

The list in Article 9(2) of the Competition Act is non-exhaustive, so UOKiK may also rely directly on the general prohibition in Article 9(1).

A key issue in the case will be whether terms were “imposed” on publishers. According to the case law cited in legal commentary, the absence of genuine negotiations on the part of a dominant undertaking supports a finding that terms were imposed, whereas no such imposition occurs where the trading partner itself fails to engage in negotiations. This explains why UOKiK emphasises the “sham” nature of the discussions and the information asymmetry, while Google points to the number of agreements concluded and its uniform payment model. Whether terms are unfair is assessed by reference to economic and legal criteria, so a departure from the statutory framework under Article 99¹¹ of the Copyright Act may be a significant argument for UOKiK.

Abuse of a dominant position is an objective concept: establishing an infringement does not require proof of intent on the part of the dominant undertaking. Fault, or its absence, becomes relevant only when determining the fine.

The potential consequences include:

• A financial penalty – up to 10% of the turnover achieved in the financial year preceding the year in which the penalty is imposed, including where the infringement was unintentional (Article 106(1)(1) and (2) of the Competition Act).
• Group turnover – where decisive influence was exercised over the infringing undertaking, the turnover calculation also includes the turnover of the entities exercising that influence and the entities controlled by them (Article 106(3a) of the Competition Act). As Alphabet Inc. is among the companies facing charges, the fine could be calculated by reference to the turnover of the entire group.
• An order to cease the practice, issued in a decision by the President of UOKiK (Article 10 of the Competition Act).
• Nullity of legal acts – legal acts constituting an abuse of a dominant position are void by operation of law, either in their entirety or in the relevant part (Article 9(3) of the Competition Act). A finding of abuse could therefore also have implications for licence agreements already concluded with publishers.

European context and parallel proceedings

UOKiK joins other authorities that have already used competition law to address disputes between Google and publishers.

The Commission’s proceedings concern AI services, while the Polish proceedings concern search results and the News and Discover services. According to UOKiK, the scope of the two cases was agreed with the European Commission before the Polish proceedings were initiated.

In Poland, the case forms part of UOKiK’s broader scrutiny of Big Tech companies. Proceedings against Apple are in their final stages and concern allegations that, under the guise of protecting privacy, it may have acted to the detriment of developers of competing mobile applications. A preliminary investigation is also under way into Meta’s changes to the way links to press publications are displayed.

Points to watch

The bringing of charges does not prejudge the outcome, but it is already setting a benchmark for negotiations between publishers and platforms.

• For publishers and media organisations: the right to information under Article 99¹¹ of the Copyright Act is gaining practical support. During negotiations, publishers should consider making formal requests for information on how their content is used, the revenue generated and the parameters used to calculate remuneration, and documenting any refusals. Two independent avenues are available in the event of a dispute: seeking a determination of remuneration by the President of UKE and notifying the President of UOKiK of an anticompetitive practice. Publishers that have already signed agreements should monitor these proceedings, including with a view to the possible application of Article 9(3) of the Competition Act.
• For digital platforms: a uniform, Europe-wide fee model and the number of agreements concluded do not provide protection against allegations where negotiations lack transparency. Platforms should consider reviewing their negotiation procedures and the scope of information disclosed to publishers.
• How the case may develop: the French example illustrates a possible progression from allegations to commitments and then penalties for failure to comply with those commitments. In parallel, decisions by the President of UKE determining remuneration can be expected, realistically, around the turn of 2027. According to UKE, remuneration is intended to cover the period from the commencement of the use of press publications until the date of the decision. Either party will be entitled to challenge the decision before a court, which could prolong the dispute by several years. The use of press content by AI services remains a further issue in the background.

We will continue to monitor the proceedings and report on further developments.